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POST-VIABILITY ABORTION BANS
AND THE LIMITS OF THE HEALTH EXCEPTION
Michael J Tierney*
INTRODUCTION
From Roe v. Wade' in 1973 to Planned Parenthood v. Casey2 in 1992
to Stenberg v. Carhart3 in 2000, the Supreme Court has consistently
held that the states have more power to regulate abortions subsequent
to viability than prior to viability. Once the child is potentially able to
live outside the womb, a state may even ban abortions so long as it
provides an exception for situations in which an abortion protects a
mother's life or health. But what does it mean to have a health excep-
tion? Some circuits interpret this health exception so broadly as to
include mental health. Recent Supreme Court cases imply, however,
that mental health is not a constitutionally mandated component of
the health exception.
I. BACKGROUND OF MAJOR CASES
Constitutional abortion jurisprudence began with the 1973 deci-
sion of Roe v. Wade. Contrary to some misperceptions, however, Roe
did not constitutionalize abortion on demand. Rather, Roe set up a
trimester system whereby in the third trimester, states could regulate
and even proscribe abortions.4 Nevertheless, Roe required that these
abortion bans include an exception for "the preservation of the life or
health of the mother."
5
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2005; B.A., Dartmouth
College, 1999. I would like to thank Professor Charles Rice for his helpful
suggestions.
1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
3 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
4 Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65 ("[Slubsequent to viability, the State in promoting its
interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even pro-
scribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for
the preservation of the life or health of the mother.").
5 Id. at 165.
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As of 1973, the line between the second and the third trimester
was roughly analogous to viability. Due to improving medical technol-
ogy, however, the age of viability occurs earlier and earlier. In the
1992 case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court replaced
the trimester system with a distinction made at viability. 6 Today, prior
to viability, states may not place an "undue burden" on a mother's
choice to procure an abortion.7 After viability, however, states may
proscribe abortions as long as they provide an exception for the
health and life of the mother.8 Finally, in the 2000 case of Stenberg v.
Carhart, although limited in its application to partial birth abortion
bans, the Supreme Court strongly implies that a mental health excep-
tion is not required in the post-viability context.9
II. STATES' STATUTORY ATTEMPTS TO BAN POST-VLABILITY ABORTIONS
Three quarters of the states have legislation banning post-viability
abortions.10 The majority of these states provide an exception to pre-
serve the life or health of the mother, without defining what "health"
6 505 U.S. at 872.
7 Id. at 846.
8 Id. at 879.
9 See infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
10 ALA. CODE § 13A-13-20-7 (1994); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2301.01 (A) (West
2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-705(a) (Lexis 2000); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 123468 (West Supp. 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-602 (West 2003); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(b)(1) (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(1) (West 2002);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141(c) (2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-608(3) (Michie 2004);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 510/5 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-34-2-1 (a) (3), 16-
34-2-3 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 2003); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-6703 (2002); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.780 (Banks-Baldwin 2003); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.4(B) (West 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1598 (West
2004); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1122, § 12M (West 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.14 (West 1991), as construed in People v. Bricker, 208 N.W.2d 172, 175-76
(Mich. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412(3) (West 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 188.030(1) (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-329 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 442.250 (Michie 2004); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 125.00, 125.05, 125.45 (McKinney 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14.45.1(b) (2003);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04(3) (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.17 (Anderson
2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-732 (West 2004); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3211
(West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-20(c) (Lexis
2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-5 (Michie 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1-
201(c) (3) (2003); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 170.002 (Vernon 2001); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-302(2), 76-7-302(3)'(Supp. 2004), construed injane L. v. Bangerter,
794 F. Supp. 1537, 1544 (D. Utah 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74(b) (Michie 1996);




means, I while other states expressly allow "health" to include mental
health.' 2 Other states proscribe post-viability abortions, excepting
only those necessary to protect the life or physical health of the
mother.' 3 Nevertheless, these post-viability abortion bans are only
rarely enforced. Four possible reasons explain this lack of enforce-
ment. First, for those cases involving the physical health or life of the
mother exception, states rarely enforce these bans because of an ex-
pectation that the bans may be struck down under the Sixth Circuit's
precedent. 14 Second, post-viability abortion bans may not be widely
enforced because states have changed priorities, and those groups
11 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2301.01 (A) (West 2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-
705 (a) (Lexis 2000); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123468 (West Supp. 2004); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-602 (West 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(1) (West 2002);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141 (c) (2003); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 510/5 (West 2003);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 2003); Ky. REV,. STAT. ANN. § 311.780 (Banks-Baldwin
2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.4(B) (West 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 1598 (West 2004); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.14 (West 1991), construed in Peo-
ple v. Bricker, 208 N.W.2d 172, 175-76 (Mich. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412(3)
(West 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.030(1) (West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-329
(1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14.45.1(b) (2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-732 (West
2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-23A-5 (Michie 1994) (after the twenty-fourth week);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-201(c)(3) (2003); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.15 (West 1996 &
Supp. 2003); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-102 (Lexis 2003).
12 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12M (West 2004) (during or after the twenty-
fourth week when there is danger to life or grave impairment of physical or mental
health); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 442.250 (Michie 2004) (after the twenty-fourth week
when there is danger to life or grave impairment of physical or mental health); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04(3) (2004) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-20(c) (Lexis
2002) (life or physical or mental health); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 170.002
(Vernon 2001) (prevent death or serious impairment to physical or mental health);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-302(2), 76-7-302(3) (Supp. 2004) (after twentieth week to
prevent death or grave impairment to health), construed injane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F.
Supp. 1537, 1544 (D. Utah 1992) (noting legislative intent not to exclude mental
health from definition); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74(b) (Michie 1996) (prevent death or
substantial and irremediable impairment of mental or physical health).
13 ALA. CODE § 13A-13-20-7 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(b)(1) (1997);
IDAHO CODE § 18-608(3) (Michie 2004); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-34-2-1 (a) (3), 16-34-2-3
(West 1997 & Supp. 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6703 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-
20-109(1) (2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.00, 125.05, 125.45 (McKinney 2004); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.17 (Anderson 2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3211 (West
2000); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-23-5 (2002).
14 Part III.A of this Note explains why the Sixth Circuit's decision in Voinovich v.
Women's Medical Professional Corp., 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), is erroneous and
should not be followed. Stated simply, the Sixth Circuit relies upon precedent inter-
preting statutory texts that include health and makes the leap from statutory interpre-
tation to constitutional mandate. Where the Supreme Court has had to rule on the
constitutionality of physical health only exceptions, it has upheld these statutes.
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most likely to push for enforcement of the laws are now focusing their
already scarce resources on fighting partial birth abortions. 15 Third,
for the states that include a mental health exception, the ban has no
impact and therefore there is nothing to enforce. 16 Finally, there are
the problems of enforcement stemming from both the difficulty in
distinguishing between physical and mental health and the difficulty
in determining the age of viability.
17
Although the Court has clearly stated there must be an exception
to post-viability abortion bans when the mother's health or life is in
danger, it is unclear how broad that health exception must be. Many
states wish to limit the health exception to physical health because an
exception for mental, emotional and social health takes all force out
of any ban. Nevertheless, the states may have a legitimate fear that a
court would disapprove of their post-viability abortion ban statutes
without such a mental health exception. Only two circuits have
looked at the necessity of a mental health exception, and the only
circuit to directly address the question held that a mental health ex-
ception was necessary. Very shortly after Roe in 1973, the First Circuit
refused to find unconstitutional a Rhode Island ban on post-viability
abortions because of a lack of standing. I8 More recently, in 1997, the
Sixth Circuit in Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich19 struck
down an Ohio law precisely because it lacked a mental health excep-
tion. Ignoring the pleas of a sizable number of states to resolve this
issue as well as the arguments of three of the Justices, the Supreme
Court denied the petition to review.20 With so much attention fo-
cused on partial birth abortion, the states have missed the Supreme
Court's reinforcement of the foundation upon which post-viability
abortion bans without a mental health requirement lie. In its 2000
Carhart decision, the Supreme Court clarified its understanding of
15 With the enactment of the Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
105, § 3(a), 117 Stat. 1206, the fight against partial birth abortions has been trans-
ferred to the federal arena. Already, some states are starting to look at their post-
viability abortion statutes. See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, PROHIBIT
POsT-VIABILTy ABORTIONS, Oct. 16, 2003, at http://www.nyscatholicconference.org/
pages/our.agenda/ showissueDetails.asp?id=63 (lobbying to change the health ex-
ception in New York's post-viability abortion ban to be exclusively physical health).
16 Part III.C of this Note discusses this problem.
17 These will be discussed in Part IV, infra.
18 Rodos v. Michaelson, 527 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1975).
19 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997).
20 Voinovich v. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp., 523 U.S. 1036 (1998). Chief Justice
Rehnquist together with Justices Scalia and Thomas would reverse the Sixth Circuit
and uphold the Ohio law. For many of the same reasons given in Part III.A, infra, the
three justices argue that Voinovich is contrary to the Court's holdings in Casey and Roe.
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Casey and called into question the Sixth Circuit's holding. Contrary to
the result reached in Voinovich, a ban on post-viability abortions is
likely constitutional without a mental health exception.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EXCEPTION FOR PHYSICAL
HEALTH ONLY
A post-viability abortion ban is constitutional with only an excep-
tion for preserving the life or physical health of the mother. 21 Some
courts have summarily dismissed the claim that a mental health excep-
tion is required. The Fourth Circuit has stated: "[W] e doubt that the
Court would require an emotional health exception even to an abor-
tion regulation that banned certain abortions entirely. ' 22 Neverthe-
less, other courts have found a mental health exception is
constitutionally necessary by looking to Doe v. Bolton23 and United
States v. Vuitch.
24
A. Voinovich Is Not Valid Precedent
In Voinovich, the Sixth Circuit found an Ohio statute banning
post-viability abortions with an exception for the life or physical health
of the mother to be unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit ignored the
Supreme Court's 1992 Casey decision that upheld a physical health
only exception. The Sixth Circuit thought they could distinguish Voi-
novich from Casey because Casey dealt with a forty-eight hour delay and
not a complete ban.25 Although a forty-eight hour delay is less of an
impediment than a complete ban, the law in Casey is not necessarily
milder than the law in Voinovich. While the Ohio law in Voinovich only
banned abortions post-viability, the Supreme Court in Casey upheld a
physical health only exception throughout the entire pregnancy, in-
cluding prior to viability. The Supreme Court clearly holds that a state
has more power to regulate abortions post-viability than pre-viability.
26
21 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921, 930 (2000) (quoting Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
164-65 (1973))).
22 Planned Parenthood v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 352, 375 n.7 (4th Cir. 1998).
23 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
24 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
25 Women's Med. Prof 1 Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 207 (6th Cir. 1997).
26 See Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930 (finding that states have considerably more power
to restrict abortion post-viability than they do pre-viability); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (finding that state regulations of abortion prior to
viability are subject to a far more stringent standard); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
164-65 (1973) ("[S]ubsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the
potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion
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The Supreme Court has been less clear about exactly what the
health exception in Roe entails. While there are many places to look
for guidance, the Sixth Circuit was wrong to look to Vuitch and Doe to
establish that a mental health exception was constitutionally man-
dated. Both of these decisions were statutory interpretations and not
constitutional mandates.
Vuitch was the Supreme Court's interpretation of a District of Co-
lumbia statute that prohibited abortions with an exception "for the
preservation of the mother's life or health."27 The Court analyzed the
statutory definition of health in Vuitch to determine if the exception
for health was unconstitutionally vague. 28 In interpreting the District
of Columbia's statute, the Court found that "health" includes mental
health. 29 The Court reached this conclusion only after investigating
the legislative history of the act. Because the 1901 Congress failed to
express intent to interpret health one way or another, the Court saw
no reason to disagree with the lower court's interpretation of health
as including mental health.
30
Courts would be wrong to rely on the health definition in Vuitch
for the health exception required for post-viability abortion bans. In
Vuitch, the Supreme Court interpreted "health" in a pre-existing stat-
ute rather than what health must mean in future state statutes. Also,
while Congress may have left a vague exception forjust "health" in the
1901 District of Columbia statute, the Ohio statutes and those of other
states are not vague. The Ohio statute provided an exception for the
life of the mother or "serious risk of the substantial and irreversible
impairment of a major bodily function." 3' The Sixth Circuit decided,
by the language and the legislative history, that the Ohio legislature
clearly sought to provide an exception only for physical health.32
Doe v. Bolton was decided on the same day as Roe and dealt with a
Georgia statute that proscribed abortion with an exception for when
an "abortion is necessary because continuation of the pregnancy...
would seriously and permanently injure [the mother's] health."'33
The health exception in Doe was challenged as being unconstitution-
except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of
the life or health of the mother.").
27 402 U.S. at 68.
28 Id. at 72.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 70.
31 Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 206 (6th Cir. 1997)
(quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2919.16(F), 2919.17(A)(1) (Anderson 2003)).
32 See id.
33 410 U.S. 179, 183 (1973).
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ally vague. The Court held that, like the District of Columbia statute
in Vuitch, Doe's exception was not unconstitutionally vague.34 The
Court found that whether "'abortion is necessary' is a professional
judgment that ... may be exercised in light of all factors-physical,
emotional, psychological." 35 The Doe Court interpreted the Georgia
statute as having a mental health exception and therefore concluded
it was not unconstitutionally vague. However, Doe did not address the
issue of whether such an exception was necessary.
Therefore, while reliance on Doe and Vuitch may lead one to the
conclusion that health alone, absent any statutory context or legisla-
tive history to the contrary, may include mental health, it does not
require that health always be interpreted to include mental health nor
that a mental health requirement is constitutionally mandated. Fi-
nally, Doe should not be read as defining the health exception for
post-viability abortion bans because the Doe Court interpreted a stat-
ute that banned abortions both prior to and subsequent to viability.
Throughout Roe, Casey, and Carhart, the Court has been explicit that
there are different standards for bans on abortion before and after
viability.3 6 .
The Court could not have had an all encompassing definition of
health in mind when it provided an exception for the "preservation of
the life or health of the mother" in Roe and Casey. Casey upheld a
physical health only exception to pre-viability delays to abortion.
37
Even if the Court meant health to include mental health in 1973, its
reaffirmation in 1992 cannot be seen as including mental health be-
cause it had upheld a physical health only statute.
Given that the Court has upheld physical health only exceptions
to delay in the pre-viability context, it would also be logical to uphold
physical health only exceptions to post-viability bans. A state has con-
siderably more power to restrict abortion post-viability than it does
34 Id. at 191.
35 Id. at 192 (emphasis added).
36 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (finding a state has consider-
ably more power to restrict abortion post-viability than it does pre-viability); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (finding that state regulations of abor-
tion prior to viability are subject to a far more stringent standard); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) ("[S]ubsequent to viability, the State in promoting its inter-
est in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe,
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the pres-
ervation of the life or health of the mother.").
37 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 880. The pre-viability delay in the Pennsylvania statute
included an exception for "substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily
function." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (West 2000).
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pre-viability.38 The Supreme Court has considered abortion only once
in the last ten years. 39 In that case, the Court struck down a ban on
partial birth abortions because it did not include a health exception at
all. The Nebraska legislature intentionally left out a health exception
because of its findings that partial birth abortions are never necessary
to protect the health of the mother.40 However, the Court cited con-
flicting evidence regarding whether a partial birth abortion reduces
"blood loss and risk of infection; reduces complications from bony
fragments; reduces instrument-inflicted damage to the uterus and cer-
vix."'41 The Court also cited other possible physical health risks includ-
ing "disseminated intravascular coagulopathy and amniotic fluid
embolus. ''42 Nowhere does the Court cite any mental health risks that
could be avoided by having a partial birth abortion. The Carhart
Court did not consider a mental health exception necessary. It is
highly unlikely that the Court inadvertently did not mention mental
health or felt the issue was already resolved on other grounds. The
Carhart decision is extremely thorough and explains many of the pos-
sible physical health problems even though they are admittedly ex-
tremely rare.43 Furthermore, even though the act could be held
unconstitutional simply for lacking a health exception, the Court fully
explains that even if it had a health exception, the act affected some
pre-viability abortions and therefore could be an undue burden.
44
B. Balancing Liberty and Life
The Supreme Court has consistently held that in the abortion
context, there must be a balancing between the woman's liberty inter-
est and the state's interest in the protection of the child's life. The
Court clearly stated in Casey:
[V]iability, as we noted in Roe, is the time at which there is a realistic
possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb,
so that the independent existence of the second life can in reason
and all fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides
the rights of the woman.
4 5
38 See Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930.
39 See id.
40 Id. at 931-32.
41 Id. at 932 (quoting the District Court in Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d
1099, 1126 (D. Neb. 1998), affd, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)).
42 Id. at 933.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 930.
45 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (citing Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)).
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Because the state's interest in protecting life is recognized in Roe,
Casey, and Carhart as supreme to a woman's liberty interest subse-
quent to viability, the restrictions on the state's power to ban abor-
tions is considerably lessened after viability. Nevertheless, a state still
cannot ban post-viability abortions if an abortion was necessary to save
the mother's life. 46 The Court sees life on both sides of the equation
and has decided that because the child has life at risk and the woman
has life and liberty at risk, the balance tips toward the mother's side.
Following this logic, the Court has also tipped the balance toward the
mother's choice to have an abortion when not having one could pre-
sumably endanger the mother's health drastically enough to be life
threatening. The phrase used by the Court throughout its cases, "for
the preservation of the life or health of the mother,"
47 should be given
a narrow interpretation.
Mental and emotional health issues, when added to the woman's
liberty, are not enough to trump a child's right to life. First, mental
health does not implicate the same risk of death that serious bodily
harm entails.48 Furthermore, it has been doubted whether mental
health can ever be improved by abortions, and there is widespread
agreement that having an abortion can have negative psychological
effects. 49 Dr. Fred Mecklenburg, a member of the American Associa-
46 See Carhart, 530 U.S. at 929 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (quoting Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973))).
47 Id.
48 Suicidal tendencies will be explored in Part IV, infra.
49 See Brian D. Wassom, Comment, The Exception that Swallowed the Rule? Women's
Medical Professional Corporation v. Voinovich and the Mental Health Exception to Post-
Viability Abortion Bans, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 799, 845 (1999) (noting "several have
argued that no responsible psychiatrist would ever recommend that a patient have an
abortion"); see also Joyce L. Dunlop, Counseling of Patients Requesting an Abortion, 220
PRACTITIONER 847, 850 (1978) (stating that immature teenagers are especially suscep-
tible to the disorder); Nadja Burns Gould, Postabortion Depressive Reactions in College
Women, 28J. AM. C. HEALTH ASS'N 316, 316-20 (1980); Monte Harris Liebman &Jolie
Siebold Zimmer, The Psychological Sequelae of Abortion: Fact and Fallacy, in THE PSYCHO-
LOGICAL ASPECTS OF ABORTION 127, 127-38 (David Mall & Walter F. Watts eds., 1979)
(reporting twenty-four immediate and long-term reactions to abortion); Janet Mattin-
son, The Effects of Abortion on a Marriage, in ABORTION: MEDICAL PROGRESS AND SOCIAL
IMPLICATIONS 165, 165-77 (Ruth Porter & Maeve O'Connor eds., 1985) (noting that
couples show a delayed grief reaction to the abortion, with many still troubled years
after the abortion); Roberto Mester, Induced Abortion and Psychotherapy, 30 PSYCHO-
THERAPY AND PSYCHOSOMATICS 98, 99 (1978) (concluding that induced abortion is a
stressful experience, and women may unconsciously ignore or minimize emotional
pain); Anne C. Speckhard & Vincent M. Rue, Post Abortion Syndrome: An Emerging Pub-
lic Health Concern, 48 J. SOC. IssuEs 95 (1992) (finding posttraumatic stress disorder
may result post abortion).
20041
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tion of Planned Parenthood physicians stated: "There are no known
psychiatric diseases which can be cured by abortion. In addition there
are none that can be predictably improved by abortion .... (Instead),
it may leave unresolved conflicts coupled with guilt and added depres-
sion which may be more harmful than the continuation of the preg-
nancy. ' 50 Therefore, even for the women whose mental or emotional
health may suffer by giving birth, their mental health will also suffer
by knowingly aborting their viable child.5' In fact, in most cases a
woman's mental health will suffer more by abortion than by delivering
the baby. A Danish study showed that while giving birth increased
psychiatric admissions by approximately 150%, having an abortion in-
creased admissions by almost 250%.52 While we cannot turn back the
clock and prevent the pregnancy from occurring in the first place, we
are obligated to do the same balancing that is done throughout the
abortion context. As the Court has stated, "a woman who fails to act
before viability has consented to the State's intervention on behalf of
the developing child."5 3
C. Dichotomy of Mental Health Exception
When interpreting statutes, the Court has found that Congress
should always be assumed to have intended each section to have sepa-
rate meaning. It is a "cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no
provision should be construed to be entirely redundant."54 This ca-
non of statutory construction can also be applied to understanding
the Court's interpretation of Constitutional rights. The Court has re-
peatedly held that, after viability, a state may ban abortions as long it
provides an exception "for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother."55 Roe's recognition that a state "may, if it chooses, regulate,
and even proscribe abortion"56 means nothing if the health of the
mother exception encompasses any possible mental, psychological,
emotional or social reason.
50 DAVID C. REARDON, ABORTED WOMEN, SILENT No MORE 169 (1987).
51 See Henry P. David et al., Postpartum & Postabortion Psychotic Reactions, 13 FAm.
PLAN. PERSP. 88 (1981) (providing a comparison of admissions to psychiatric hospitals
of women delivering babies and women obtaining abortions).
52 See id. at 89 (noting psychiatric admission rate of 7.5 per thousand for all wo-
men, 12.0 per thousand for women who gave birth and 18.4 per thousand for women
who aborted).
53 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
54 Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (plurality opinion).
55 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 929 (2000) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879
(quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973))).
56 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
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Nearly all agree that where there is a mental health exception to
the ban, there is no ban at all. Michael Paulsen recently stated: "Be-
cause of the 'health' exception to abortion regulation in the last tri-
mester, the mother may choose abortion for essentially any personal,
family or emotional reason."5 7 Brian Wassom pointed out that
"[e]xpress or implied mental health exceptions have given physicians
so much diagnostic discretion as to make such [state post-viability
abortion ban] laws worthless." 58 There are no published cases of a
state with a mental health exception ever attempting to enforce its
ban.59 The result of a very broad reading of health is that "the excep-
tion entirely swallows the rule."60
Because a ban with a health exception that includes mental
health would not be a ban at all, the Court's instruction for health
exception must include only physical health. Allowing the health ex-
ception to encompass mental health removes all meaning from the
Court's recognition that states can ban post-viability abortions.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH ENFORCEMENT
Over three quarters of the states have post-viability abortion
bans 6' but very few seek to enforce them. This is most probably due
to a belief that the laws were not constitutional following Voinovich, or
had no teeth in them due to an express or implied mental health
exception.62 Having established that states can constitutionally ban
post-viability abortion with an exception for physical but not mental
health, we must briefly investigate some potential problems with en-
forcing post-viability abortion bans. These problems will generally be
related to difficulty in determining the distinction between mental
and physical health or the difficulty in determining viability.
A. The Distinction Between Physical and Mental Health
The line between physical and mental health is definitely a very
fine one. In many cases, physical health issues cause mental health
57 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 995, 996 n.4 (2003).
58 Wassom, supra note 49, at 862.
59 For a list of the seven states with mental health exceptions, see supra note 12.
60 Carhart, 530 U.S. at 1012 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
61 For a list of the states with post-viability abortion bans, see supra note 10.
62 For a list of states with mental health exceptions to their bans, see supra note
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issues63 and vice versa. Nevertheless, in determining how to make the
distinction between physical and mental health, one should consider
the reasons why such a distinction was made in the first place. Serious
physical health issues can endanger the mother's life. When constitu-
tionally balancing the life of the child with the liberty of the mother,
the scale is tipped to the mother's choice when her physical health is
in such danger as to implicate a danger to her life. 64 Because, with
one exception, emotional, social or mental health does not impact the
life of the mother to such a degree as to endanger her life, the child's
life takes precedence over the mother's choice. 6 5 The exception, of
course, is when continuing the pregnancy may lead to psychological
stress so great as to encompass suicidal tendencies.
The health exception to post-viability bans should not encompass
women with suicidal tendencies. Studies suggest the suicide rate for
women who abort is considerably higher than for those who give
birth. A Finnish study found the "suicide rate after an abortion was
three times the general suicide rate and six times that associated with
birth."66 Another study found women who had abortions are nine
times more likely to attempt suicide than the general population. 6 7
Allowing a mother with suicidal tendencies to abort a viable fetus
would therefore seem to increase the chances of that mother injuring
herself as compared to her risk in carrying the baby to term. Further-
more, while it is always difficult to quantify psychological harm, abort-
ing a viable child is more psychologically damaging than aborting a
pre-viable child.68 The solution for women with severe mental
problems is not to abort and forget but to receive proper psychiatric
63 For example, consider post-partum or post-abortion depression. See David et
al., supra note 51, passim; Wassom, supra note 49, at 851-52.
64 See the balancing discussion in Part III.B, supra.
65 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (citing Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)) ("[T]he independent existence of the second life
can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the
rights of the woman.").
66 Mika Gissler et al., Suicides After Pregnancy in Finland, 1987-1994: Register Linkage
Study, 313 BRIT. MED. J. 1431, 1433 (1996).
67 REARDON, supra note 50, at 129. Note that the difference in the rate in the
Finnish study from this study is that Reardon's study showed that attempted suicides
were nine times more likely while the Finnish study tracked actual suicides. Neverthe-
less, both show a much higher suicide rate for women who have abortions.
68 See Wassom, supra note 49, at 853 (" [T] he one fact that seems nearly axiomatic
in psychological literature on abortion is that the later in pregnancy one aborts, the
greater the woman's risk for negative emotional sequalae.").
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help. 69 In excluding women with suicidal tendencies from the health
exception, states are not only protecting the child's life but are also
exercising their constitutionally protected right to restrict abortion to
protect maternal health.
70
B. Problems in Determining the Age of Viability
In any post-viability abortion ban, there exists the problem of de-
termining viability. Viability is the point at which a fetus could, with
or without technological support, live outside the womb. This is not
as easy to determine as it may seem. There are two problems. First,
the Court has imposed limitations on how viability can be deter-
mined. 71 Second, viability is a fluid concept that changes with evolv-
ing medical technology and is substantially different for each
person.
72
Viability is generally understood to be somewhere between the
twentieth and twenty-fourth week.73 Although many state statutes
have determined a presumptive age of viability,
7 4 courts have gener-
ally held that viability is a matter solely within the discretion of the
attending physician. 75 The Third Circuit has held that "a statute that
established the limit for performance of abortions in terms of the
weeks of pregnancy would have been invalid."76 Furthermore, statutes
requiring doctors to test for viability prior to performing late term
abortions have been held unconstitutional because they have the pos-
sibility of placing an undue burden on a woman's choice, as the test
69 See REARDON, supra note 50, at 169 ("When abortion is substituted for adequate
psychiatric care-and there is ample evidence to suggest that this is already happen-
ing- . . . [the mother] is the one who cries for help, and she is also the one who is
turned away.").
70 See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 973 (1997) (recognizing the state's
interest in maternal health in a state statute prohibiting abortions by non-physicians).
71 See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283,
298 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding that the presumptive age of viability cannot be legislatively
determined).
72 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976) (finding that the
age of viability varies with each person).
73 There are some cases of babies surviving who were born as early as the nine-
teenth week but it is not until the twenty-fourth week that a baby has a twenty percent
chance of survival. Ohio Right to Life, Viability: When?, at http://www.pregnantpause.
org/numbers/mvhlive.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2004).
74 For example, both Massachusetts and Nevada set it at twenty-four weeks. MAss.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12M (West 2004); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. 442.250 (Michie
2004).
75 SeeJane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir. 1996).
76 Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 298.
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would be unnecessary if the baby is not viable. 77 The Supreme Court
stated:
[N]either the legislature nor the courts may proclaim one of the
elements entering into the ascertainment of viability-be it weeks of
gestation or fetal weight or any other single factor-as the determi-
nant of when the state has a compelling interest in the life or health
of the fetus.
78
Therefore, the states are caught in a Catch-22. They are power-
less to determine or even know when viability begins, yet they are una-
ble to require doctors to test for viability. The attending physician
who has complete discretion in determining whether the child is via-
ble and therefore whether an abortion is legally permissible also usu-
ally has a financial incentive to determine that a debatably viable child
is not viable because he is paid to perform the abortion.
Determining viability is also difficult because viability is such a
fluid concept. The Court has recognized that the "time when viability
is achieved may vary with each pregnancy."79 Furthermore, as medical
progress advances, the age of viability has been constantly changing.
It is impossible for a legislature, court or a doctor to know precisely
when viability occurs. Nevertheless, "there is no line other than viabil-
ity which is more workable."
80
CONCI.USION
As medical technology advances there may come a time when all
abortions are post-viability. In the meantime, there are over 15,000
abortions performed post-viability every year.8 ' As fifty different states
democratically decide how best to protect life, the states should un-
derstand that they have the power to ban post-viability abortions.
While the Court has held that there must be exception for the life or
health of the mother, this exception need not include a mental health
exception. In fact, a mental heath exception eliminates the ban's im-
pact. Although enforcement of these bans may be complicated due to
77 Bangerter, 102 F.3d at 1117.
78 Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388-89 (1979).
79 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976).
80 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
81 KeithJ. Grady, Note, The Value of Life, Thornburg v. American College of Ob-
stetricians and Gynecologists, 10 HAMLINE L. REv. 623, 623 (1987). Similarly, the
CDC estimates that 1.4% of all abortions or approximately 16,600 abortions take
place after twenty weeks. PLANNED PARENTHOOD, ABORTION AFTER THE FIRST TRIMES-
TER, at www.plannedparenthood.org/library/facts/abotaftlst_010600.html (last vis-
ited Aug. 31, 2004).
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difficulty associated with determining the age of viability, the bans re-
main constitutional and have the potential to save thousands of lives
each year.
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